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Abstract
Intended to shed light on the debate on the results of globalization and provide
better understanding of the influences of globalization upon China as well as the
world, this article traces the history of Shanghai’s economic globalization over the
past 170 years since 1843 and demonstrates the benefits and problems Shanghai
received from (or connected to) its economic globalization. Divided into three
sections (Globalization, de-globalization and re-globalization of Shanghai’s economy;
Manufacturing-Oriented vs. Tertiary-oriented—Shanghai’s Double Priority
Strategy of Economic Growth; Free market, state enterprises, and Shanghai’s mixed
economy) the article summarizes and analyzes several characteristics that made
Shanghai a unique model in the history of globalization: In adapting and adopting
inevitable economic globalization, Shanghai created its unique model of economic
development—widely embracing economic globalization; placing Shanghai’s
economy on a solid foundation of both strong modern manufacturing and strong
tertiary industry (consisting of finance and insurance, real estate, transportations,
post and telecommunication, wholesale and retailing); and creating a mixed
economic structure with hybrid of private and state owned enterprises. The
Shanghai model proves that globalization has been an unavoidable trend as science
and technology have made the world “smaller” and “smaller.” Actively engaging into
economic globalization is the only way for Shanghai, as well as many developing
countries, to accelerate its economic growth.
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Introduction
Economic globalization has been a hot topic among scholars since the 1980s. Debates
have never stopped over the advantages and disadvantages of economic globalization for the
world, particularly for the developing countries. Some scholars look at globalization with
skepticism and criticize economic globalization for causing serious problems such as the northsouth conflict, the gap between rich and poor, and environmental deterioration, thus triggering
the global economic crises. In the meantime, other scholars look upon globalization favorably
and see a more diverse and better life for all resulting from economic globalization. They
believed that economic globalization has accelerated free market flows and enabled the optimal
distribution of productive elements in the world and thus promoted the growth of world
productivity and provided more opportunities for the developing countries, which have greatly
benefited from foreign capital and international market.1 As China’s most globalized city,
Shanghai has demonstrated all the benefits and problems resulted from (or connected to) its
economic globalization. The history of Shanghai’s economic change over the past 170 years may
shed light on the debate regarding whether economic globalization has been more harmful or
more beneficial to the world and will be certainly helpful for our understanding the influences of
globalization upon China as well as upon the world.
Globalization, de-globalization and re-globalization of Shanghai’s economy
While some scholars believe globalization is a phenomenon with a long history, most
scholars put the nineteenth century as the advent of globalization,2 when national economies
across the world became increasingly interdependent through a rapid increase in cross-border
movement of goods, services, technology and capital (Joshi, 2009). Shanghai’s economic
globalization also started in the middle of 19th century, when the Western countries forcefully
drew Shanghai into the world market after the First Opium War.3
Unlike many of China’s well-known cities, Shanghai’s history as a metropolitan city is
short, and, until 1843, it was still not an independent city. The surging demand for tea, silk, and
other Chinese products in the western countries in the 19th century provided a great historical
opportunity for Shanghai’s globalization. With the rich and vast hinterlands of the Yangtze River
Valley, Shanghai quickly emerged as a booming international trading port. Engagement into the
global economy triggered Shanghai’s geographical advantages as a port city, which greatly
strengthened its import and export function. Very soon, Shanghai replaced Guangzhou as
China’s largest treaty port for foreign trade. By the 1870s, over 60 percent of China’s foreign
trade was handled through Shanghai (Luo, 1932, p. 90). By the 1920s, Shanghai had become one
of the 14 largest trade ports in the world. The imports and exports of Shanghai made up more
than 50% of China’s total foreign trade before 1949 (Zhang, 1991, pp. 87-88; Cheng, 1956, p.
23).
Stimulated by the expansion of international trade, Shanghai’s modern industry prospered.
Thanks to the globalization of Shanghai’s economy, a large number of modern factories
appeared in Shanghai. With the advanced technology and equipment and systematic management,
these new enterprises transformed Shanghai into China’s modern industry center. By the early
1930s, about half of China’s modern manufacturing companies (1,200 out 2,435) were located in
Shanghai. These factories employed 43% of China’s industrial workers and manufactured 51%
of China’s total industrial products. Shanghai’s modern factories produced about 60% of China’s
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cigarettes from 1925 to 1935 and generated 58% of China’s electric power in 1936 at the lowest
price in the world (Liu, 1940, pp. 26; Murphey, 1953, pp. 196, 197, 200).
The economic boom and population growth yielded new demands. Modern banks,
insurance agencies, financial trusts, a stock market, a commodity market, and other modern
business service institutions boomed in Shanghai, popping up one after another. By 1935, 35%
of China’s modern banks, including 81% of China’s largest banks, set their headquarters in
Shanghai. In 1936, almost half (47.8%) of all Chinese banks had their paid-up capital, banknotes,
and deposit and bank reserves in Shanghai (Jiaguan, 1990, pp. 328-9). Shanghai’s gold trading
market was “the sole gold market in whole Far East,” and the gold trading volume in Shanghai
was behind only that of London and New York and much higher than that of Japan, France, and
India (Jiaguan, 1989, pp. 21-22). The booming of international trade, expansion of modern
industry, and increase of various business service institutions attracted more people into
Shanghai. Shanghai’s population jumped from about 200,000 in the early 1840s to one million
by early 20th century and to over 5 million by the 1949 (Zhang, 1991, pp.53-55).
By the early 1930s, Shanghai had undoubtedly consolidated its position as China’s
financial center, modern industrial center, international and domestic trade center, transportation
center as well as cultural center. Though many problems existed and many people were still
suffering economically at the time, nobody could deny the fact that economic globalization
greatly benefited Shanghai and made Shanghai the most energetic and the richest city in China.
Shanghai hit a wall, however, when it was forcefully de-globalized after 1949.
Confronting the economic embargo imposed upon Chinese exports by western countries after the
Communists took over Shanghai in 1949 Chinese leaders deliberately chose to pull China as well
as Shanghai off the course of globalization. Most foreign companies had moved from Shanghai
to Hong Kong by 1949. The ones that had not left before 1949 departed shortly thereafter, as no
remaining foreign companies could survive due to unreasonably high taxes and numerous
restrictions set up by the new Chinese government and were forced to escape from Shanghai
(Jiaju, 1983).
The newly-established Chinese government tightened their control over China’s foreign
trades. Other than trade with Soviet Union blocs and very limited trade with Hong Kong,
Shanghai’s economy was almost entirely secluded from rest of the world. In the meantime,
Shanghai lost its position as China’s financial center. The gold market, stock market, bond
market, and commodity market were all banned. China’s People’s Bank in Beijing controlled
Shanghai’s finance so tightly that Shanghai’s banks became little more than an accounting house
for the government. Compared to other East Asian centers of commerce, such as Tokyo,
Singapore, Seoul, Taipei, and Hong Kong, all of which experienced spectacular growth after the
Second World War, Shanghai was left far, far behind in the next three decades.
The people of Shanghai made great efforts to save Shanghai’s economy under such
unfavorable business conditions and kept Shanghai’s position as China’s most advanced city
before China’s economic reform started in 1978. For several decades, Shanghai won “ten
number one” positions in China, as measured by major economic matrixes, including industrial
output value, foreign export value, labor productivity, industry profit and assets turnout rate per
capita gross national product, energy efficiency rate, revenue submission, etc. Despite falling
from the international trade scene, Shanghai still made one eighth of China’s industrial product
value, handled one fourth of China’s exports, and contributed to one third of the Chinese central
government’s revenue before the middle of 1970s.4

Journal of International and Global Studies
62

These “ten number ones,” however, were sharply contrasted by Shanghai’s “five tailenders,”
as measured by the matrixes of social, human, and environmental development. Shanghai’s high
revenue contribution came at the cost of severely crippling Shanghai's infrastructure and the
deterioration of the standard of living for the people of Shanghai. The rapid population explosion
made Shanghai the most crowded city in China. Additionally, since the government invested
almost nothing in building houses, roads and other basic public facilities, the crowding was
compounded by poor and unsanitary living conditions. By the late 1970s, Shanghai’s per capita
road length was 1.57 square meters, and the crowded roads led to high incidences of car
accidents. With auto casualties as high as 42.5 persons/per 10,000 cars, Shanghai’s car accident
rate was the highest among China’s large cities. Even more notorious were Shanghai’s terrible
living conditions. In 1979, Shanghai’s population density was 41,000 per square kilometer, the
highest in China. Since very few housing complexes or apartments were added after 1949, the
average size of a person’s living space was smaller in Shanghai’s than in any other of China’s
large cities. Each Shanghai resident had only 4.3 square meters of living space on average and 50%
of households, or 918,000 households, had less than 4 square meters of living space per person.5
Shanghai’s per capita green space was only 0.47 square meters, just as big as a piece of
newspaper. The unrestricted industrial expansion and the ignorance of public facilities also
brought serious environmental problems to the city. Crowded public space and congested
residential space and the pollution took a heavy toll on people’s health. Shanghai’s per capita
cancer rate ranked the highest among China’s large cities.6
Shanghai’s economic superiority in China was ruined by years of overproduction and
underinvestment. Particularly when China’s other provinces were developing by leaps and
bounds after China’s economic reform started, Shanghai was rapidly left behind. During the
1960s and 1970s, Shanghai kept its GNP growth rate at about 40% higher than China’s national
average. By 1980s, however, it was 12.6% lower than China’s national average (Zhou, 2004).
Re-globalization saved Shanghai from its economic downturn and possible bankruptcy.
Immediately after China began to open itself to the world (after 1978), the people and
government of Shanghai repeatedly requested that the Chinese central government release its
tight control over Shanghai’s economy and give Shanghai more space to connect to the world
directly. The opportunity finally came in early 1990, when China’s paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping was considering taking a significant step to show the world that China would continue
to open itself to the world, something he especially wanted after the Tiananmen Square incident
of 1989. Zhu Rongji, the then Shanghai mayor, formally submitted the proposal of “opening and
exploiting Pudong.” For historical reasons, Shanghai had previously developed in a strange
model until the 1980s: Shanghai’s main river, the Huangpu River, divided Shanghai into two
distinctive economic regions. Almost all modern factories and other industrial facilities were
concentrated on the west side of Shanghai (Puxi), leaving the area east of Shanghai (Pudong)
almost entirely an agricultural zone. In the 1980s, the government of Shanghai planned to set up
a special economic zone in Pudong and make Pudong Shanghai’s second modern economic
center.
The Chinese central government accepted this proposal and decided to make Shanghai’s
Pudong the focal point of China’s economic reform for the subsequent decade by allowing
Shanghai to widely open its port back up to the world. From that time on, the keystone of
China’s reform shifted decisively from the Zhujiang Delta region centering in Guangdong
province back to the Yangzi Delta region, centering in Shanghai. If the decade of 1980s was the
“Guangdong era,” represented by Shenzhen, the first year of 1990s started a whole new
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“Shanghai era.” If Shanghai was forcefully drawn into economic globalization by western
powers in the 1840s, Shanghai’s leaders and Shanghai people consciously and wholeheartedly
embraced globalization, hundred-fifty years later in the 1990s,
Shanghai made very bold moves to re-initiate or simply invent crucial institutions for
China’s market economy. The Shanghai Stock Exchange opened for business in 1992, and more
and more state or private owned enterprises went public, thus providing huge potential for
corporate financing. Soon, the Shanghai Stock Exchange became one of the largest stock
markets in the world. Gold, metal, and other commodity exchanges and option market were
reestablished one after another in Shanghai. The Shanghai Property Exchange was invented in
Shanghai to facilitate property transition and to merge and purchase companies or company
stock shares. The establishment of these institutions and market systems provided great
opportunities for Shanghai to get necessary capital, various materials, and crucial manpower for
improving and upgrading its economic capacity, thus competing and winning in the world
market.
Starting from 1990, Shanghai spared no efforts in engaging its economy in globalization
efforts by turning all of Shanghai into a sort of paradise for international as well as domestic
investors. Shanghai’s public investment in the city’s own infrastructure held double digit
increases year by year. In 2007 alone, the Shanghai government invested about RMB 147 billion
(30% more than 2006) in Shanghai’s public infrastructure, including RMB 16 billion on
electricity and RMB 84 billion on transportation.7
Having a first class infrastructure is obviously important, but more important for
attracting investors is to provide the best services. Having had a long-standing command
economy made for notoriously burdensome levels of bureaucracy a common phenomenon in
China, which severely hindered economic progress. To open a new company, for example, one
had to pass through numerous government offices and apply for a long list of licenses or
certificates. It was not uncommon for a new company to spend months, if not years, just getting
the government’s permission to do business. To accelerate Shanghai’s economic development,
the government of Shanghai was determined to make swift, red-tape reducing changes so that
government officials would provide investors excellent, real help in acquiring the necessary
approvals (rather than lip service) in order to set up a new business establishment. For example,
it set up the so-called “one-stop shopping” service for foreign investors. Staffs from various
departments of the Shanghai government were clustered in one office (or office building) so that
investors could, in one location, get all necessary certificates to set up companies and to start to
operation.
This hard work yielded excellent results. Since 2004, for example, Fortune magazine has
published its annual investigation about China’s best city for business. The magazine sent its
questionnaires to 25,000 senior managers and entrepreneurs asking for their opinion on the
business environments in China’s large cities. For five consecutive years, Shanghai has always
ranked as “the best city for business” because Shanghai has “the best labors,” “the highest life
quality,” “the highest business efficiency” and is China’s “best city for starting [a] business,” the
“best city for business entertainment” and has most potential for business.8
Re-globalization saved Shanghai from a downward spiral, and Shanghai’s economy once
again grew by leaps and bounds. Shanghai’s foreign trade expanded even faster. For more than
15 years, until to 2007, Shanghai’s international trade value jumped more than 20% annually. By
2008, Shanghai’s import and export value reached 322 billion USD.9 By 2010, Shanghai became
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the world’s busiest cargo port. In 2011, Shanghai’s ports handled 730 million tons of cargos with
31.74 million containers, far more than any other ports in the world (Xinhua News Agent, 2012).
Shanghai's financial industry has also made a significant progress. More and more
financial and insurance institutions began to gather in Shanghai. By the end of 2008, 395 foreign
financial institutions had set up their China headquarters or branches in Shanghai, (53.1% of
China’s total foreign banks and 84.8% of capital assets of total foreign banks in China) were
located in Shanghai (Shanghaigang, 2009).
Though the Chinese economy as a whole has made great progress over the past 30 years,
Shanghai obviously achieved the most economic success among China’s 31 provinces,
metropolitans, and autonomous districts. In 1990, Shanghai’s per capita GDP broke U$1,000 for
the first time. Five years later, in 1995, the per capita GDP doubled to U$2,000. The figure
doubled again and again and reached more than US$11,809 in 2010.10 After sixteen years of
double digit growth, Shanghai’s GDP reached more than RMB 1.69 trillion (about US$268
billion) in 2010, or 62 times what it was in 1978 when Shanghai’s GDP was RMB 27.2 billion
(about 17 times in terms of US dollar because U$ 1 = RMB 1.7 in 1978) (Shanghai Overview,
n.d.).
In building an international metropolis, Shanghai has played and continues to play a
significant role in national economic development and shoulders the great responsibility of
providing services to the whole country. Despite constituting only 1% of China's population and
0.06% of China’s land space, Shanghai contributed 1/8 of the national fiscal revenue. In 2008,
Shanghai’s import and export goods made up one-fourth of the nation and its cargo handling
capacity occupied 1/10 the nation's total.11 Additionally, the health of the people of Shanghai
now matches that of those in developed countries. As of 2011, the average life-expectancy of an
individual living in Shanghai increased to 82.1 years, and all major health indices in Shanghai
have reached the same average levels as developed countries.12
Anybody who has visited Shanghai recently, particularly those who had previously
witnessed or known of Shanghai’s situation in the later 1970s would be impressed by Shanghai’s
great changes. Shanghai's remarkable record of rapid economic growth and return to prosperity
since early 1990s has resulted a new, pretty Shanghai with numerous glittery skyscrapers, an F-1
racing ring, and the world’s fastest maglev trains. All of this has been achieved in addition to the
major improvements in the average health and standard of living of the people of Shanghai (Olds,
pp. 109-123; Gu and Tang, 2002, pp. 273-303). Whatever opinion a person may have regarding
globalization, he or she would be hard pressed to challenge the fact that Shanghai has benefitted
greatly from globalization and remains one of the biggest winners in China’s process toward
globalization since the 1840s. The history of Shanghai’s globalization, de-globalization, and reglobalization demonstrates from both positive and negative angles the fact that Shanghai
benefited greatly from its embracing economic globalization.
Manufacturing-Oriented vs. Tertiary-oriented: Shanghai’s Double Priority Strategy
of Economic Growth
The world financial crisis, initiated in the United States, dealt a heavy blow to both
China’s and Shanghai’s economy. Shanghai’s GDP growth rate dropped to 9.7% in 2008 (down
from 11.6% in 2007). Though a 9.7% growth rate could still be considered comparatively high,
worldwide, it was the first time in 17 years (since 1990) that Shanghai’s economy had
experienced a less than double digit rate of growth. In discussing Shanghai’s economic situation,
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Shanghai’s mayor, Han Zheng, acknowledged the negative impact the world financial crisis
imposed upon Shanghai, but he was very confident on Shanghai’s economic future. As he said,
“All difficulties are temporary because Shanghai’s economic structure remains healthy ….
Shanghai’s competent enterprises would certainly walk out the predicament in advance.” (Jiang
Yu, 2009).
All economic evidence demonstrates that Han Zheng’s confidence was realistic because
it was based on solid economic reality. Shanghai’s economic structure is more resilient against
economic crisis than the structures of other cities and/or nations due to another characteristic of
the Shanghai model: a strategy of “double priority” (i.e. on both goods—in the form of
manufacturing—and services) for economic growth. In another words, Shanghai’s rapid
economic growth has been the result of a combination of the city’s strong manufacturing output
and a parallel tertiary industry of providing services (i.e. in the areas of finance and insurance,
real estate, transportations, post and telecommunication, wholesale and retailing). In studying
Shanghai’s role in China, various scholars have pointed out Shanghai’s position as China’s
financial center, trade center, transportation center, and various other centers, but it is Shanghai’s
position as both China’s manufacturing and tertiary industry centers that have made Shanghai a
winner in economic globalization since it emerged as an international city in early 20th century.
It is a common trend in the world that the more advanced a country is, the higher the
proportion of its economic structure comprises tertiary industry. This is particularly true in large
cities, where the cost of manufacturing escalates as the costs of labor and land keep rising over
time. In addition to such cost escalation, the manufacturing industry has more recently been
neglected or given up in many cities, as the concepts of green economy is becoming more
popular. People and governments are requesting stricter regulations to restrict, or better, to
eliminate the air, water, and other kinds of pollution that manufacturing companies might bring
to the city. Understandably, cities with the means to do so are thus inclined to expand the service
economy, particularly since services can usually generate more added value while requiring
fewer material resources. Stock exchanges and other financial institutions working in virtual
capital markets (options, insurance, mortgage, and derivative agents) generate even more profits.
Compared to the manufacturing industry, the per capita profitability an investment bank could
bring to its investors and the tax revenue it could bring to local government is certainly much
higher, maybe tens or even hundreds of times higher, at least in the short term. It is hardly a
wonder that modern cities seek to attract businesses based on virtual economy. In fact,
widespread use of the Internet and easy capital flow has made some cities nearly reliant upon
virtual industry as economic bases. In recent years, the tertiary industry accounts for 60% of
global GDP. In most developed countries, tertiary industry makes up more than 70% of GDP.
These proportions are even more pronounced among the world’s top cities. It was 80.5% in Soul,
82.8% in Tokyo, and 84.1% in New York in 2004 (Liu, 2007). In Hong Kong manufacturing
industry dropped from 25% in 1980 to about 8% in 2002 (Fishman, 2005, p. 75). In today’s age
of digital information, science and technology became major players in international competition.
It seems that the high proportion of tertiary industry signals the advancement of a city or a
country and manufacturing industry seems no longer as important as it was before.
Shanghai is no exception. Once China started its economic reform, one of priorities for
Chinese policy makers was to accelerate the growth of China’s tertiary industry. Because of
China’s manufacturing-orientated economic structure, established in the 30 years since the
People’s Republic of China was born, accelerating the growth of the service industry posed one
of the most serious problems for the Chinese economy. Before Shanghai had shut its doors
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toward the world in 1949, both the manufacturing and tertiary industries had developed side by
side, making Shanghai both the financial and manufacturing center of China before 1949. Indeed,
until 1952, the tertiary industry still made up 41.7% of Shanghai’s economic structure, and
manufacturing accounted for 52.4% of the economy (Zhou and Yan, 2004). After that, however,
Shanghai’s tertiary industry was largely ignored and the Shanghai government carried out a
manufacturing-only strategy of economic growth. By the early 1980s, Shanghai’s tertiary
industry had dropped dramatically, making up only 18.6% of Shanghai’s GDP (Shanghai
Chrography office). This was one of the major reasons why Shanghai lost its competence and
was left behind other large cities in the world from the period of time between 1950s and 1980s.
Therefore, when Shanghai began its return to the world economy in the late 1980s Shanghai’s
officials, as well as many scholars and experts, called for the accelerated transition of
Shanghai’s economic structure and advocated strongly for the promotion of tertiary industry in
Shanghai. As such, starting in the late1980s, a major strategic transition of Shanghai’s economic
structure was carried out. The Shanghai government was determined to withdraw from the
secondary industry and engage into the tertiary industry. Thousands of small factories were
closed or were forced to leave Shanghai. Upon the departure of so many factories, there was a
strong focus by city planners to develop more "green areas" and public parks among the
apartment complexes in order to improve the quality of life for Shanghai's residents, in
accordance with the "Better City Better Life" theme of Shanghai's 2010 Expo. In the meantime,
the Shanghai government paid special attention to attracting foreign, financial, and other service
companies to Shanghai.
This strategic transformation achieved great success. Thousands manufacturing factories
disappeared from downtown Shanghai and were replaced by numerous fancy shopping malls,
high-rise apartment complexes, and modern office buildings with various heights, colors and
designs. The tertiary industry of Shanghai has expanded rapidly, with an annual growth rate at 12%
since 1989. As of 2010, the tertiary industry constituted more than half of Shanghai’s industry
structure for 12 consecutive years and made up 57% of Shanghai’s GDP that year.13 Hundreds of
foreign and domestic financial institutions clustered around the Lujiazui and Bund areas. Law
firms, insurance firms, consulting firms, and various other service companies mushroomed in
Shanghai, serving the booming economic activities. The four primary sectors of the tertiary
industry (finance and insurance, real estate, transportations, post and telecommunication,
wholesale and retailing) accounted for 62% of total output. It is partly for this reason that
Shanghai has benefitted so clearly from its re-emergence as a global player. Currently, more than
80% of world’s 50 largest banks have set up branches in Shanghai. The assets, deposits, and
loans of these banks accounted more than 50% of all foreign banks in China in 2011 (Shanghai
investment development board).
Despite this massive success, it is impossible, at least in near future, for the economy of
Shanghai to depend only on tertiary industries or on a virtual economy without a strong
manufacturing industry as its solid base. Attempting to maintain only tertiary industries would be
akin to having a tree without roots or a building without a foundation. In New York, London, or
Tokyo, tertiary industries are big enough to fully sustain their respective economies because each
of these cities has had more than hundred years of continuing growth and has developed into one
of the world’s financial centers, trading centers, or fashion centers. Many companies in these
cities are providing various services to their clients throughout the world. Though Shanghai’s
firms are rapidly catching up to cities such as New York, London, and Tokyo, there is still a long
way to go before Shanghai’s service companies dominate Shanghai’s own service industry, let
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alone provide their services around the world. For example, so many fancy high-rising buildings
have been built in Shanghai recently. Few of them, however, were designed by Chinese
architects. Many of them, including the famous Xintiandi compound and the world financial
center building, are designed by foreign architecture firms. I have served as a senior advisor for
an American business consulting firm for few years and personally watched as this firm and
other famous American consulting firms or law firms followed their clients to China and
provided various services in Shanghai. When working in China, few American companies
switched to Shanghai’s domestic consulting firms or law firms (and instead retained the services
of American consulting or law firms), despite the fact that Shanghai consulting firms would have
charged far less money to provide similar services.
Furthermore, Shanghai has been selected by the Chinese government to develop as
China’s financial center. For now, however, Shanghai is not truly functioning as all of China’s
financial center (let alone the financial center of the whole world). At this time, there is more
than one financial center in China. Hong Kong has already developed as one of the biggest
financial centers in the world. Beijing seems to have a more favorable position than Shanghai in
terms of becoming the country’s financial center because China’s macroeconomic policies,
overall financial policies, and major currency policies are all made in Beijing. Besides, Shanghai
also lacks the expertise to become China’s financial center. For example, less than 200,000
people, or no more than 1% of Shanghai’s population, were working in a financial field in 2007.
In comparison, there were more than 770,000 people, or more than 3% of Beijing’s population,
worked in financial field in Beijing, and 350,000 people worked in a financial field in Hong
Kong in the same year (Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily)).
If Shanghai put all its eggs in one basket and only promotes its tertiary industry and
ignores its manufacturing industry, the worst scenario for Shanghai’s economy might occur in
the near future. First, Shanghai’s tertiary industry might not become big enough to support
Shanghai’s economic growth. And second, if Shanghai’s manufacturing industry was weakened
or ignored, other neighboring countries and Shanghai’s neighboring provinces would quickly
catch up and replace Shanghai as a manufacturing center. In the end, Shanghai would lose its
positions as both China’s manufacturing center as well as its financial center. Fortunately,
Shanghai’s policy makers have always been aware of the significance of the “real” (secondary)
economy, even while promoting the rapid growth of the tertiary industry. Once left far behind
the developed countries, the leaders of Shanghai firmly believe that the manufacturing industry,
transportation, infrastructure, and other real economy entities ultimately determine the strength
and weakness of a city or a country, and they see no reason to abandon Shanghai’s efforts to
maintain its real economic entities for this reason. It is their conviction that Shanghai must
continue to strengthen (and not ignore) its advanced manufacture-based economic structure in
order to compete effectively in the global economy. Particularly after the 1997 Asian financial
storm, the Shanghai government further confirmed its economic development strategy and
decided to promote “double priorities” and clearly announced it would give priority to promoting
both modern services and advanced manufacturing industry. “The Contents of Shanghai’s
Highly Supported Priority Industry (2008),” issued by the Shanghai government on October 17,
2008 further demonstrated this “double priorities” development strategy.14
To compete with others, of course, Shanghai has to keep upgrading its industry by
downsizing or even eliminating labor-intensive, capital-intensive, and pollution-producing
industries and introduce new and advanced industries. The process of this transition was
understandably not easy. The most painful case occurred in Shanghai’s textile industry. After the
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early 1980s, with rising prices of Shanghai’s land, labor, transportation, and other costs, the
textile industry lost competency in Shanghai, and the Shanghai government decided in the early
1990s to withdraw from the textile industry. However, at the time, the textile industry was one of
Shanghai’s main industries, providing most jobs for Shanghai’s blue collar workers. The
transition meant that most of them would lose their jobs. To upgrade Shanghai’s economic
structure, almost all textile factories inside downtown Shanghai were, nonetheless, closed. A few
of them were moved to suburbs of Shanghai. The worker force in Shanghai textile industry
shrank from 550,000 in 1993 to 280,000 from 1998. Overall, more than 600,000 workers lost
their jobs in Shanghai in the same period, and Shanghai’s unemployment rate remained in double
digits for many years during the transition period, between 1992 and 1999 (Zhu, 2008, p2).
In the meantime, Shanghai focused on developing capital-intensive and knowledgeintensive industries with great potential in the future. As early as the early 1990s, Shanghai
government designated six “pillar industries” for Shanghai’s industrial focus, including
automobiles, electronic, and communication equipment, petrochemicals, steel products,
equipment assembly, and biomedicine. From 2002 to 20007, Shanghai’s investment in industry
reached RMB 450 billion, 80% of which went to these six pillar industries, including RMB150
billion in electronic & information industry and RMB 90 billion in petrochemical and fine
chemical industry (Cheng). Today, these six industries realize about two thirds of Shanghai’s
total industrial output. Shanghai also spared no efforts in luring foreign direct capital investment
in its advanced manufacturing industry by offering special policies such as generous tax holidays
to investors. Those new production-oriented enterprises with foreign investment would get
income tax exemption for two years following the first year the company began to make profit
and then a 50% of tax reduction in the years three through five. The benefits for those exportoriented companies (for whom the output value of all export products amounted to 70% or more
of the output value of the enterprise) were even better. They were permitted to enjoy their tax
reduction at a reduced rate of 10% after their income tax exemption or reductions period had
expired in accordance with the state stipulations. These tax holidays were even more attractive
for those newly-built enterprises engaged in energy resource and transport construction projects
such as airports, ports, railways, highways and power stations. These companies did not need to
pay income tax for the five years after their first profit-making year and from years six to ten,
their income tax was reduced by 50% (Shanghai Metropolitan government).15
Fortunately for Shanghai, technological innovation initiated a great industrial transition in
the world since the late 1980s. To adjust to ever growing costs of labor, land, and other
necessities in manufacturing and the stricter regulations on manufacturing industries, the
developed countries underwent a major industrial shift after the 1980s. Large numbers of heavy
industry companies transferred their manufacturing facilities to developing countries. Over the
past 20 years, Shanghai’s manufacturing has attracted more foreign investment capital than any
other industry in most years. Though the tertiary industry grew 78.3% from 2002 to 2007 with an
average growth rate of 12.2%, Shanghai’s manufacturing industry expanded even a faster
(growing 86.2% with average growth rate of 13.3% in the same period).16 Comparing to other
major cities in the world, Shanghai’s manufacturing industry made up a much large portion of its
economy. As late as 2007, the manufacturing industry still makes up 47.3% of Shanghai’s
economy.
Currently, Shanghai’s government still maintains its “double priority” strategy as
Shanghai’s long-term development strategy. As the financial crisis is running deeper in the world,
China has had to switch its export-oriented development strategy to focus more on promoting
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China’s domestic consumption of goods. Shanghai is planning to lead the country in further
promoting Shanghai as a “consumer paradise.” Recently, in addition, the Disney Corporation has
started building a new Disney Park in Shanghai. The Shanghai government is actively fighting to
win a second license to build a horse racing course in Shanghai. Some scholars have proposed
the development of a “Chongming-Shanghai’s last oasis”—as China’s Geneva—which would
make Chongming an environmentally friendly city and attract major international institutions,
just as Geneva did (J. Yang & C. Jiahai, personal communication, July 5, 2010). With these
major projects, Shanghai’s service industry will certainly continue to expand.
In addition to these efforts toward the increasing of consumerism, Shanghai’s
government paid equal if not more attention to promoting the city’s manufacturing industry. To
that end, more capital was spent on upgrading the six pillar industries of manufacturing:
automotive, electronic, and communication equipment, petrochemical, steel, equipment
assembly, and biomedicine. Simultaneous to these upgrades, Shanghai was designated by the
Chinese government as the headquarter location for the building of China’s large commercial
aircrafts. Specifically, this implies that the Chinese central government has confirmed and
supports Shanghai’s own double priority strategy. When China’s State Council recently
announced China would build Shanghai into an international financial center and an international
transportation center by 2020, it specially emphasized that the target should be accomplished by
further pushing Shanghai’s “modern service industry and advanced manufacturing industry.”17
Undoubtedly, the manufacturing industry will continue occupy an important position in
Shanghai’s economy in the future.
Free market, state enterprises, and a mixed economy
Another characteristic of the Shanghai model is its strong emphasis on upholding a mixed
economic structure, with a hybrid of state-owned and non-state owned companies. Since China’s
economic reform started in 1978, non-state owned companies maintained rapid rates of
expansion and became the most important engines in promoting China’s economic growth. By
the end of 2006, two-thirds of China’s GDP were created by non-state owned company. Nonstate owned companies employed more than 80% of workers, and 70-80% of added value in
China’s economic growth came from non-state owned companies (Zhou, 2008).
However, the situation is a little different in Shanghai. Unlike Shanghai’s neighboring
provinces (such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang), the government’s strong hands have been always
visible in Shanghai’s economic changes, and state-owned enterprises in Shanghai have always
played an important role in promoting Shanghai’s local economic growth. The Shanghai
government has also never hesitated in supporting state-owned companies (though it had not
publicly said so). Though non-state owned companies have grown steadily in Shanghai since
early 1980s, state-owned companies grew even faster and still made up the majority of
Shanghai’s economy. In 2007, the state-owned companies accomplished GDP of RMB 659
billion and accounted for 54.9% of Shanghai’s GDP, while non-state owned companies
accounted for 45.1%.18 (It is important to note that most non-state owned companies in Shanghai
belong to foreigners or overseas Chinese. Few large Chinese private companies ever existed in
Shanghai, and those that do exist in Shanghai migrated from other provinces).
For a long time, particularly after the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, most
scholars and international financial institutions blamed the crisis on Asian governments’
involvement in their nations’ economies and held up the free market system as a model for all
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countries to follow. It was a common conclusion among western economists that the government
intervention of economy and state-owned enterprises were hopelessly non-efficient and that the
market system was a more natural, risk-free system. However, numerous studies on the
remarkable economic growth of Asian countries showed that market liberalization alone could
not have brought about Asia’s remarkable economic growth. Though many Asian countries
underwent a transition from a dirigisme (an economy in which the government exerts strong
directive influence) to liberalized economic regime, the transition “was made possible by the
combination of appropriate economic policy pursued by the respective national governments and
the competitiveness of Asian entrepreneurs, business models, and disciplined workforces that
had been nurtured in the context of Asia’s cultural, commercial, and business traditions”
(Taniguchi, 2009). Shanghai’s experiences over the past thirty years further underlined the truth
of this comment. Indeed, the financial crisis that started in America in 2008 shows just how risky
a totally liberalized economic model can be, especially without proper supervision. In the
meantime, Shanghai’s experiences over the past thirty years further underlined the truth of this
comment.
The dominance of state-owned companies in Shanghai had its historical origins. As a
crucial contributor to China’s state revenue, Shanghai’s economy was always tightly controlled
by the Chinese central government after 1949. Even after China started its economic reform in
1978, Shanghai still assumed a heavy fiscal burden. Worried about the uncertainty of its bold
economic reform, the Chinese central government made Shanghai a sort of safety valve for
China’s fiscal income and took about 80% of Shanghai’s newly increased product value every
year from 1949 to 1990. During that period, Shanghai’s accumulative fiscal income was 391
billion RMB. From that 391 billion, 328 billion or 83.94% was submitted to the central
government.19 Therefore, Shanghai’s strictly command economy survived with little change until
the late 1980s. As a result, there was little room left in Shanghai for private enterprises, just as it
had been before China’s economic reform started.
Another, more important reason for Shanghai’s high percentage of state-owned business,
however, results from a simple pragmatic concern. Four decades of “de-globalization” dragged
Shanghai’s economic growth down and left Shanghai far behind the rest of the world. To catch
up, Shanghai has had to jump start its economic transition. As I mentioned above, when
Shanghai began to re-globalize its economy, Shanghai’s infrastructure had already deteriorated
severely due to long time neglect during the period of Shanghai’s de-globalization. In the 30
years from 1950 to 1980, Shanghai’s investment in infrastructure accounted for only 7.38% of
the revenue that Shanghai submitted to the central government (Shen, 1980). As a result,
Shanghai had no money to expand roads, build apartments, or improve electricity, water,
telephone and other public services. A person who once visited Shanghai in the 1930s would be
no stranger to the Shanghai of the 1980s due to the city’s narrow roads and crowded residence
areas. To catch up to foreign countries as well as to other Chinese provinces, Shanghai had to
improve and upgrade its public infrastructure as fast as possible. However, doing so costs
significant sums of money, and it may be quite a long time before seeing a positive return on
such investment. If the work of upgrading Shanghai’s infrastructure was left to a free market
system and private enterprises, then little or no headway would be quickly made. Much time
would be wasted in “wait and see” games. Both foreign and domestic investors would be
unwilling to put their money on either consumer industry or producer’s industry without the
development of social overhead investments in transportation facilities, power supply, and public
utilities, whereas the latter investments would not be increased unless there is a definite demand.
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Consumers’ industries cannot easily expand without an adequate supply of capital goods at
reasonable prices, but a capital goods industry would not make its move without seeing a clear
outlook of consumers’ markets. In addition, private companies in China must worry about any
possible change in government policy. Given all of this, it would have been difficult (if not
impossible) for private entrepreneurs take the lead in investing in public facilities in Shanghai.
Since each sector of the economy was waiting for the other to roll the ball first, other countries
and other provinces continued to develop further while leaving Shanghai much fewer
opportunities to develop. The situation was not unusual to many developing countries. Therefore,
the Shanghai government had no choice but to assume the responsibility of taking the lead in the
strategic development projects with state-owned companies. The development of Shanghai’s
Pudong area is a good example.
As I mentioned before, the Pudong area was basically an agricultural zone until the late
1980s. To attract investment, the first thing to do was to build more advanced infrastructure in
the Pudong area. However, where would the money come from? It was estimated in 1990 that
the total cost for Pudong’s enhancement would reach RMB 800 billion (more than U$100
billion),20 an enormous figure for Shanghai at the time. The Chinese central government had
made it clear to Shanghai that though the central government supported the expansion of Pudong,
it would only give Shanghai the economic autonomy to raise construction capital; the
government would not provide money for the project. The mission to get seed money to trigger
Pudong’s infrastructure build-up could only be taken up by the Shanghai government.
Immediately after the project of developing Pudong was approved, the Shanghai
government designated 570 square kilometers of land in Pudong to set up the “Pudong New
District.” Several state-owned companies, created by the government of Shanghai, initiated a
special land leasing program, or the so-called “Kong madai beimi” (translated as “Grasp rice
with empty bag,” meaning to get money with zero capital investment), as Professor Yang
Jianwen vividly described (J. Yang, personal communication, March 2009).21 Several pieces of
land within this area were auctioned to foreign investors, particularly to Chinese individuals
living overseas (known as “overseas Chinese”) and to those from Hong Kong, Taiwan, among
other places. The foreigners who won the bet were granted the rights to use of the land for
seventy years. This move ignited a thundering rage in China. Many people compared this
program with the foreign concessions existing in Shanghai before 1943. They claimed that the
proposed land lease program betrayed China’s national interest (since Shanghai’s foreign
concessions were long seen as a symbol of China’s suffering under imperialist oppression). The
project would never have survived such a public attack without the support of the government of
Shanghai.
With the money on hand, the Shanghai government started to build the necessary
infrastructure in Pudong. Though it was not large amount of money in the beginning, it did
trigger a cycle. Once the infrastructure project started, the value of land in Pudong New District
began to rise. The government then put more land for lease at a higher price. The enhanced land
value attracted more investors around the world because they saw potential for further increase
of land value there. More capital came in and thus increased land value even further, which lead
more capital to flood in. The value of immovable property in Pudong New District skyrocketed
in the next decades. This cycle went on and on and provided funding for most infrastructure
projects in the Pudong area.22 The Pudong International Airport, the Meglev train, and other
substantial projects were built one after another with astonishing speed. Four bridges, six
underground tunnels, and subways connecting Pudong to Puxi were accomplished, making
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Shanghai’s economy more intergrated with other nearby regions. From 1990 to 2004, the total
investment in Pudong’s infrastructure reached more than RMB 90 billion (US$12 billion).23
Ever improving infrastructure and other favorable policies attracted huge capital inflow.
From 1990 to 2004, the total investment in Pudong’s fixed assets exceeded RMB530 billion
(about US 70 billion). Many of these assets came from direct foreign investment. By the end of
August 2005, overseas investors had invested in more than 12,000 projects in Pudong New
District with a total contractual investment of 28 billion US dollars. From the beginning, Pudong
aimed to introduce advanced industry, represented by multinational companies and make itself
on the high end of product value chain and the magnet to high quality talents and entrepreneurs.
By the end of August 2005, 57 regional headquarters of multinational corporations had located
here. More than 80 foreign-invested enterprises have built R & D Centers in Pudong. About 194
corporations of the world’s top 500 companies listed in Fortune magazine have invested in over
400 projects in Pudong.24
After more than 15 years of development, the Pudong New Area underwent great change
and emerged as a complete new Shanghai. The GDP of the Pudong New Area has maintained an
annual growth rate of over 20% for more than 18 years. The industrial output value in Pudong
reached RMB352 billion in 2004, taking 25% of the total in shanghai. Supported by the Chinese
central government, the Pudong New District quickly emerged as a foreign-oriented, multifunctional, modern urban area.
In pushing for the development of Pudong, re-globalization also significantly changed the
old Shanghai in the Puxi area (west of the Huangpu River). Since almost everything in Pudong
was started from scratch, and it would take time before Pudong would begin to play a productive
role in Shanghai’s economic development, Shanghai actually paid even more attention to the
reforming and upgrading of existing infrastructure in Puxi. As some scholars joked, Shanghai
adopted a policy of “shen dong ji xi” (making a feint attack to the east and an actual attack in the
west) in the first several years of the 1990s (J. Yang, personal communication, March 2009).
Taking full advantage of the special policies the central government granted Shanghai to
develop the Pudong New District, the Shanghai government also applied the same land lease
program in the Puxi area, just as they had done in Pudong. Again, no private company would
have been qualified for this mission. Since no systematic industrial distribution plan was ever
carried out in Shanghai before the 1990s, thousands of small and middle sized textile, machinery,
chemical, iron, and steel factories were scattered around Shanghai’s downtown area, mixed in
among commercial and residential areas. Not only did such industries bring a huge burden onto
the deteriorating infrastructure, but they also caused pollution and severely downgraded real
estate value in downtown Shanghai. To recreate Shanghai as an ideal place for international
investors, thousands of small and middle sized factories were closed or moved to suburban areas.
The spared lands were then leased to real estate developers and other investors by auction. The
government took the money from leasing those lands to improve infrastructure. Shanghai’s
reputation and improved infrastructure in its downtown area triggered of high expectation on the
land and property value in Puxi area. The same income-generating cycle occurred in Puxi as it
had in Pudong and attracted more investors. By 2000, Shanghai had already collected more than
U$13 billion through land lease program for Shanghai’s infrastructure construction. Without this
funding, according to a former mayor of Shanghai, Shanghai’s completion of its infrastructure
projects between 1990 and 2000 would not have been finished in 100 years (Chen and Zhou,
2009, pp. 262-3). Significant investment in infrastructure brought Shanghai a very sound city
infrastructure. In turn, Shanghai once again became an attracting city for living and investment.
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The log-jams of Chinese socio-economic problems, however, could not have been broken
nor the level of economy lifted without an efficient, honest, and competent government.
Bolstering domestic capital formation and inducing foreign investment would not have been
possible if the government itself had been corrupt. Official corruption is one of the most serious
troubles China faces. Well aware of the significance of this problem, the Shanghai government
devoted itself to creating a service oriented, responsible government that is committed to the rule
of law and that will conscientiously regulate the economy, monitor the markets, manage social
programs, serve the public, and protect the environment. Many special policies were carried out
to prevent official corruption and unnecessary bureaucracy. In Shanghai, all large government
projects must be transparent and go for public auction. In addition to supervising the behavior of
officials in various levels according to Chinese laws, the Shanghai government also designed
stricter rules and regulations to discipline Shanghai’s officials when necessary. It is commonly
accepted that, relatively speaking, Shanghai’s officials behave more appropriately than those in
most of other Chinese cities.25
While Shanghai’s government attended to providing oversight of state officials after
Shanghai reopened to the world, Shanghai’s state-owned companies made great efforts to
transform themselves into modern corporations in order to survive in the market. As happened
everywhere in the world, state-owned companies often encounter many troubles such as low
productivity, inefficiency, and slow adjustment to the market changes. To enhance their
compatibility in the world market, Shanghai’s state-owned companies had to insert themselves
directly in the world market through fierce competition with non-state owned companies, both
foreign and domestic. Learning from the world’s best multinational companies, Shanghai’s stateowned companies also introduced various advanced management systems. Many companies
arranged to build strategic partnerships with foreign companies or reorganized themselves to be
public, stockholding companies, not only to gather the necessary capital but also to use outside
investors in order to make strategic changes in the company. In recent years, most Shanghai’s
state-owned companies have enhanced their productivity and profitability, even though there is
still a long way to go for many.
The Shanghai government also knew that state-owned companies alone, however, would
not be enough to fully fuel Shanghai’s economic rejuvenation. A better model for Shanghai’s
special situation, they thought, would be a mixed economy, with a hybrid of both state-owned
and non-state owned companies competing with and compensating each other. Therefore, the
government also spared no effort in promoting non-state owned companies, particularly foreign
owned companies. As many people know, China has attracted most of its foreign direct capital in
recent years. During these recent years, Shanghai has profited more from foreign investment than
China has as a whole. During the past 16 years, Shanghai’s foreign direct investments (FDI)
rapidly increased, with annual growth rate up to 36%, 10% higher than that of China as a whole.
In 2006 alone, Shanghai attracted U$14.6 billion FDI, 23% of China’s total FDI. In 2007, 4,206
foreign investment projects were approved in Shanghai. The contractual volume increased by 2%
to 14.87 billion USD. The paid-in capital increased by 11.4% to 7.92 billion USD, of which
about 5.32 billion USD or 67.1% was attracted to the tertiary industry.26 By the end of 2007,
48,753 foreign investment projects had been approved in total, with an investment volume of
US$129.41 billion. By the end of November 2008, the Shanghai government had approved 671
multinational corporate headquarters projects, including 223 multinational corporate regional
headquarters, 178 holding companies, and 270 R&D centers.27 By end of 2007, there were more
than 33,000 companies invested in Shanghai by foreign companies. Among Fortune 500
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companies, 227 companies invested in 1,221 projects in Shanghai, with total capital of 18.397
billion dollars.28
In addition to foreign owned companies, the Shanghai government also adopted policies
to encourage the development of Chinese private companies. Shanghai’s previous reputation as
China’s economic center and its newly established financial and information facilities attracted
many private entrepreneurs to invest in Shanghai. Since it is convenient in Shanghai to get
financial, legal, consultant, and various other services and collect information on markets,
products, fashion trends, etc., many of China’s major private companies moved their
headquarters to Shanghai or set up branch offices and R&D centers in Shanghai in order to take
advantage of Shanghai’s convenience and Shanghai’s markets. The Shanghai government also
deliberately invited private companies to participate in public projects, including those typically
monopolized by state industry, such as the project to build China’s commercial aircraft. Since the
Shanghai government set in motion the building of social infrastructure, transportation, and
financial institutions, it not only started the economic ball rolling but also set the tempo of
Shanghai’s industrial development. Shanghai’s entire consumption expenditures, savings, and
investments were also guided to ensure speedy economic development. Non-state owned
companies, both foreign and domestic, saw the potential of Shanghai’s development and flooded
into Shanghai market. In 2010, non-state owned companies contributed RMB 833 billion (about
U$ 132 billion) or 49.4% of Shanghai’s GDP.29
Both visible and invisible hands played unique roles in accelerating Shanghai’s economic
expansion over the past 20 years. As a result, a relatively balanced, mixed economic structure
emerged and has worked quite well in Shanghai so far. With this kind of mixed economic system,
Shanghai’s government has managed to rationally allocate Shanghai’s economic resources by
implementing various economic policies, including controlling contract placement of public
projects, release of capital goods, and other means. The non-state backed economy was also
geared to making progress by adjusting rapidly to changing market conditions and making itself
complementary to the government economy. Shanghai’s experience shows that a mixed
economy with hybrid of private and state-owned enterprises might be better for the economic
development of a developing country during an era of globalization.
In summary, Shanghai built its own model for developing its economy based on its
positive and negative experiences and lessons over the past 170 years. In adapting to and
embracing the seemingly inevitable economic globalization, Shanghai created its own unique
model of economic development—widely embracing economic globalization; placing
Shanghai’s economy on a solid foundation of both advanced modern manufacturing and a strong
tertiary industry; and depending on a mixed economic structure with a hybrid of private and state
owned enterprises. The Shanghai model proves that globalization has been an inevitable trend, as
science and technology make the distances between nations of world smaller and smaller.
Actively engaging into economic globalization is the only way for Shanghai, as well as many
developing countries, to accelerate economic growth.
1

For examples, see (in Chinese) See Lu Xianggan, New trend in studying the economic
globalization, People’s Daily, May 15, 2000, p. 15. Also see (in English) Givanni Arrighi,
Beverly J. Silver, Benjamin D. Brewer, Industrial convergence, globalization, and the persistence
of the North-South divide, Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID), vol. 38,
No. 1 (2003). Marc T. Jones, Peter Fleming, Unpacking Complexity Through Critical
Stakeholder Analysis The Case of Globalization, Business and Society, vol. 42, No. 4, Dec. 2003.
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2

Some scholars argued that a form of globalization has been in existence since the rise of trade
links between Sumer and the Indus Valley Civilization in the third millennium B.C. See History
of globalization (Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_globalization).
3

Also known as the Anglo-Chinese war (1839 to 1842). Before the war, the Western merchants
could only do business with China in one Chinese port, Canton. The war broke out when Chinese
government tried to ban British merchants from smuggling opium into China. After China was
defeated, a treaty was signed between Britain and China, which stipulated that China has to open
Shanghai and other four ports to foreign trades.
4

For example, Shanghai’s industrial profit rate was four times of national average and its
industrial labor productivity was 1.5 times higher than national average. Shanghai’s economy
kept its growth at 11.3% annually from 1950 to 1980. Shanghai was the largest contributor of
fiscal revenue of the Chinese central government among Chinese provinces. See Shen Junpo,
Shige diyi he wuge daoshu diyi shuoming le shenme (What does the ten number ones and five
tailenders mean?) On Jiefang ribao, Oct. 3, 1980.
5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

7

See Shanghai Foreign Economic Relation & Trade Commission website: Investment
Shanghai—Infrastructure (http://www.investment.gov.cn/investment/html/cn/A-xzshjcss/201031723334822955305499743206.html?infoId=1152500440076). I deliberately used the
Chinese version in this paper since it is upgraded more frequently and reflected more recent
information.
8

Shanghai has ranked as the best city for business for 5 successive years, on Fortune (Chinese
version), Jan. 1, 2009.
9

Shanghai government, News release on Jan. 22, 2009, see Shanghai investment development
board website (http://www.investment.gov.cn/2009-01-22/1232343775371.html).
10

Shanghai government website, Shanghai Overview-economic power. See
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node3766/node3796/node18137/index.html.
11

Shanghai Foreign Economic Relation & Trade Commission, Feb. 16, 2008, Investment
Shanghai-Shanghai’s position in China. See the commission’s website,
(http://www.investment.gov.cn/2005-10-21/1129906656057.html).

12

Shanghai government website, Shanghai Overview-population
(http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node82288/node82367/userobject1ai111771.html).
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13

Shanghai government website, Economy-ownership structure
(http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node3766/node3796/node23304/index.html).
14

The contents can be found at Shanghai Foreign Economic Relation & Trade Commission
website, Investment Shanghai—Investment Directory
(http://www.investment.gov.cn/investment/html/cn/A-tzzncydx/20103172129307864078382307043.html?infoId=1223859157164).

15

Also see the similar regulations issued by China’s Ministry of Finance on 9/11/1990,
(http://www.86exp.com/tax/tax-knowledge/wzqy/2006-07/200607305218.htm).
16

Shanghai Foreign Economic Relation & Trade Commission website: Investment Shanghai—
Industrial structures, (http://www.investment.gov.cn/investment/html/cn/A-xzshjjjg/20103172124293569087838009817.html?infoId=1129906656061).
17

China’s State Council, Guowuyuan fabu shanghai liangge zhongxin jianshe yijian (State
Council issued its opinion on build up Shangahai’s two center), on April 30, 2009, Zhengquan
shibao, cited from the Hexun qihuo website, http://futures.hexun.com/2009-0430/117259499.html.
18

Shanghai investment development board, Shanghai Economy-ownership structure, on the
board’s website. (http://www.investment.gov.cn/2005-10-21/1129906656083.html).
19

Shanghai Chrography office, 1949-1990 nian shanghaishi caizheng defang fencheng shouru
tongjibiao (Table of Shanghai’s fiscal revenue distribution, 1949～1990, cited from the office’
website (http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node4445/node57355/node57357/
node57359/userobject1ai44257.html).
20

On the Beijing News, No. 75, Pudong kaifa (Pudong Exploration), on its website,
http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/reform30/2008/05-03/021@073843.htm.
21
Interview with Professor Yang Jianwen (March 2009), the director of Institute of Economy at
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Prof. Yang is one of the twelve policy experts Shanghai
Municipal government appointed. He actively engaged in designing the strategy of Pudong
exploitation at the time.
22

Ibid.

23

Qin Yong, Li Jiatian, Shanghai pudong: xinguannian chuangzhao qiji (Shanghai Pudong: new
perspective created magic), on Chongqing ribao (Chongqing Daily), April 22, 2008.

24

Ibid.
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25

I have interviewed many American and Chinese business people who have involved in
Chinese business for long time. Almost all of them confirmed this recognition. The downfall of
Chen Liangyu, Shanghai’s party secretary, was more a result of political struggle among Chinese
Communist Party rather than seriousness of Chen’s corruption.

26

See Shanghai Foreign Economic Relation & Trade Commission website: Investment
Shanghai--foreign investment (http://www.investment.gov.cn/A-xzsh-wstz/index.html).
27

See the above website: “Investment Shanghai-multinational corporate investment.”
(http://www.investment.gov.cn/investment/html/cn/A-xzshwstz/20103172350269047295133865462.html?infoId=1152500440050)

28

See the above website, http://www.investment.gov.cn/investment/html/cn/A-xzshwstz/201031721475607025501070689755.html?infoId=1262222623319.

29

Shanghai government website, Economy-ownership structure
(http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node3766/node3796/node23304/index.html).
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